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Abstract  
Quine and Davidson employ proxy functions to demonstrate that the use of language 
(behaviouristically conceived) is compatible with indefinitely many radically different 
reference relations. They also believe that the use of language (behaviouristically con-
ceived) is all that determines reference. From this they infer that reference is indetermi-
nate, i.e. that there are no facts of the matter as to what singular terms designate and 
what predicates apply to. Yet referential indeterminacy yields rather dire consequences. 
One thus does wonder whether one can hold on to a Quine-Davidson stance in seman-
tics-cum-metaphysics and still avoid embracing referential indeterminacy. I argue that 
one can. Anyone adhering to the behaviouristic account pivotal to the Quine-Davidson 
stance is bound to acknowledge certain facts about verbal behaviour – that some utter-
ances are tied to situations, that some utterances are tied to segments in situations, that 
some predicates have non-contextualised conditions of application, and that use in-
volves causal dependencies. The restrictions from these facts ensure that only reference 
relations generated by means of rather exceptional proxy functions are compatible with 
verbal behaviour. I conclude that this allows one to rebuff the Quine-Davidson argu-
ment for the indeterminacy of reference, as it were, from within. I moreover tentatively 
conclude that the line of thought laid out provides good reason for just about anyone to 
hold that there are facts about reference after all.  
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Reassessing Referential Indeterminacy 
1.  The Thesis Explored 
Celebrated ideas often share the fate of human celebrities: they become shrouded in a 
haze of publicity, adoration, and rumour. This might very well be true of the claim that 
reference is indeterminate.
1 So let me begin with some clarifications. Firstly, the thesis 
concerns semantic reference, not speaker’s reference.
2 It is a thesis about what singular 
terms as well as their utterances designate and what predicates as well as their utter-
ances apply to. Secondly, the thesis is not an epistemological claim.
3 What is claimed is 
rather that there are no facts of the matter as to what singular terms designate and what 
predicates apply to. Speaking of the ‘inscrutability of reference’ hence is misleading – 
as Quine acknowledges: “It is what I have called inscrutability of reference; ‘indetermi-
nacy of reference’ would have been better”
4. Thirdly, the thesis is neither to be confused 
with, nor grounded in, the claim that many terms are vague and/or ambiguous. Neither 
phenomenon plays any role in the arguments Quine and Davidson put forth. Indetermi-
nacy of reference is thought to arise even if we idealize away vagueness and ambiguity. 
Fourthly, the indeterminacy of reference is independent of any indeterminacy of logical 
form. Quine and Davidson agree that even if one assumes a determinate logical form, 
reference still comes out indeterminate.
5 Finally, the thesis is meant to cover all lan-
guages. Indeterminacy is not confined to distant primitive tongues. As the saying goes, 
indeterminacy begins at home.
6  
Anyone who holds that reference is indeterminate is hence committed to the claim 
that there are no facts of the matter as to what singular terms designate and what predi-
cates apply to.
7 To render this idea more lucid, let me define an interpretation of a lan-
guage L to be a complete assignment of extensions to the singular terms and predicates 
of L.
8 Let us furthermore agree to call some interpretation correct for some language L 
if and only if it is compatible with all the facts that determine the semantic properties of 
L.
9 Employing this terminology, the thesis that reference is indeterminate – that there 
are no facts of the matter pertaining to reference – unfolds thus:  
(IR)  For every language L, there are indefinitely many fundamentally different yet 
equally correct interpretations. 
This is precisely what Quine and Davidson, the avowed champions of indeterminacy, 
seek to establish. Please note that the claim they aim to prove is neutral with respect to 
their general approach in semantics-cum-metaphysics. The indeterminacy thesis is nei-
ther wedded to any specific stance in semantics, nor is it intrinsically linked to the sce-
nario of radical translation or interpretation, respectively. Since Quine and Davidson 
often run the thesis together with what they take to be the argument to establish its truth, 
this is easy to miss.
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The indeterminacy thesis is not perfectly neutral, though. It comes with two rather 
sensible background assumptions. The one assumption is that semantic facts are de-
pendent facts. What sentences mean – what their truth conditions are – and what words 
refer to is in the end fixed by non-semantic facts. Assuming otherwise would run 
counter to what Quine and Davidson believe.
11 It furthermore would turn at least some 
semantic facts into brute facts, and that is hardly appealing.
12 The other assumption is 
that reference is a substantial relation between words and things rather than a purely 
disquotational intra-linguistic relation. That again makes sense. For it is very hard to see 
how reference could possibly be indeterminate if all facts about reference were ex-
hausted by trivialities such as “‘rabbit’ denotes rabbits”. Disquotational theories of ref-
erence do not so much solve the indeterminacy problem as sidestep it.
13  
The purported indeterminacy poses a serious threat to anyone’s understanding of the 
interrelation of mind, language, and the world. If (IR) is true, neither any singular term 
nor any predicate stands in any determinate relation to things in the world. Imagine you 
assert “Gene Kelly was the greatest dancer ever”. Your assertion will be about very 
many different objects – Mount Everest and Khrushchev’s shoe, say – and it will put 
these objects in very many different classes. That will be true in every single case. We 
hence cannot use our singular terms to pick out certain things rather than others, and we 
cannot use predicates to classify certain objects rather than others.
14 The indeterminacy 
of reference thus dissolves reference. As Leeds puts it: “Let us take inscrutability of ref-
erence as having shown that there is no such relation as reference”
15. Worse still, given 
that what you have said is just what you have thought, (IR) implies an indeterminacy of 
thought. The indeterminacy of reference thus dissolves intentionality, too.
16 We conse-
quently can rely neither on language nor on thought to relate to the going-ons in any 
specific region of the world. Yet it is very hard to envisage what else could allow us to 
do so. If reference is indeterminate, then, we are sort of losing the world. Not everyone 
will think that that is all too well.  
In fact, not even everyone who subscribes to a Quine-Davidson stance in semantics-
cum-metaphysics will think that this is all too well.
17 The question thus is, can she do 
something about it? Imagine that you are a staunch adherent of the Quine-Davidson 
stance in semantics-cum-metaphysics. Can you hold on to these views and still escape 
(IR) and its dire consequences? Quine and Davidson think that you cannot. They argue 
that once you have endorsed their approach to semantics-cum-metaphysics, acknow-
ledging that reference is indeterminate becomes inevitable. I beg to differ. I will argue 
that even a committed adherent of their general views can indeed avoid subscribing to 
(IR).
18 More precisely, I will argue that a Quine-Davidson stance in semantics-cum-
metaphysics provides all the means needed to undercut the inference from the principles 
of that stance to the indeterminacy of reference. I thus maintain that one can rebuff the 
indeterminacy thesis, as it were, from within. I will moreover argue – though somewhat 
tentatively – that anyone adherent the Quine-Davidson approach should rather reject the 
indeterminacy thesis. For I think that the failure of the general argument Quine and Reassessing Referential Indeterminacy 
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Davidson rely on to infer (IR) provides good reasons to believe that reference isn’t 
really indeterminate at all.  
2.  The Argument for the Indeterminacy of Reference  
Quine and Davidson argue that the totality of all relevant facts radically underdeter-
mines the interpretation of any given language. From this they conclude that reference 
is indeterminate.
19 Suitably expanded, the Quine-Davidson argument for the indetermi-
nacy of reference is best captured by the following scheme:
20 
(a)  Semantic properties are exclusively determined by A facts. 
(b)  For any language L, the totality of A facts is compatible with indefinitely many 
radically different interpretations.  
Hence: 
(IR)  For any language L, there are indefinitely many radically different yet equally 
correct interpretations.  
Quine and Davidson agree on which facts the A facts are. They both subscribe to same 
variety of the ‘meaning is use’ thesis: they hold that semantic properties are exclusively 
determined by facts about the linguistic behaviour of speakers.  
It is well known that Quine endorses this claim. He has urged for a long time that in 
semantics, a behaviourist approach is mandatory – “In psychology one may or may not 
be a behaviourist, but in linguistics one has no choice”
21 – and he has time and again 
expressed his conviction that the totality of actual and possible behaviour is what fixes 
semantic properties: “[W]e recognize that there are no meanings, nor likenesses nor dis-
tinctions of meaning, beyond what are implicit in people’s dispositions to overt behav-
ior”
22. Quine’s understanding of ‘use’ is consequently thoroughly anti-intentional. He 
takes the behaviour relevant to the determination of semantic properties to be exhausted 
by acts of assenting to, or dissenting from, posed queries, and he identifies these acts 
with bodily movements: “[L]et us adopt the term surface assent for the utterance or ges-
ture itself. My behavioural approach does indeed permit me, then, only to appeal to sur-
face assent; assent as I talk of it must be understood as surface assent”
23. Quine more-
over acknowledges that use thus understood involves causal dependencies. Conse-
quently, he is careful to point out that it is prompted assent rather than assent simpliciter 
that grounds semantic facts.
24 
It is less widely appreciated that Davidson shares Quines use account of semantic 
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Perhaps the most important thing [Quine] taught me was that there can be 
no more to communicative content of words than is conveyed by verbal be-
havior. This seems obvious to many people: ‘meaning is use’, quoth Witt-
genstein. (...) What wants emphasizing is not that use points the way to pre-
existing meanings, but that it creates, and so constitutes, meaning.
25 
Given the central role propositional attitudes play in Davidson’s picture, one would pre-
sume that he adheres to an intentional understanding of ‘use’.
26 However, Davidson 
makes it very clear that he agrees with Quine on the non-intentional nature of semanti-
cally constitutive behaviour: “[M]eaning is entirely determined by observable beha-
viour, even readily observable behaviour”
27. There is a reason to this. Davidson holds 
that semantic as well as intentional properties are in the end constituted by triangulation 
– i.e. by the causally mediated social process of reciprocal reaction in a ‘pre-linguistic, 
pre-cognitive situation’
28. According to Davidson, meaning and belief are hence 
grounded in mere behavioural reactions. He thus shares Quine’s non-intentional under-
standing of ‘verbal behaviour’ as well as Quine’s conviction that causal dependencies 
contribute to constituting semantic facts.  
Their shared view on what determines semantic properties lies at the very heart of 
the Quine-Davidson approach to semantics. In fact, it snugly fits with the methodology 
of radical interpretation/translation so ubiquitous in the Quine-Davidson tradition. For 
given that semantic properties are constituted by verbal behaviour non-intentionally un-
derstood, it is easy to explain why an interpreter/translator working under the strictures 
notoriously labelled ‘radical’ can indeed uncover all semantic and intentional facts there 
are – just as Quine and Davidson think he can.
29 Hence, the outlined identification of 
the A facts and the corresponding reading of premise (a) of the argument sketched is 
non-negotiable for anyone embracing the Quine-Davidson approach to semantics-cum-
metaphysics.  
The question to be raised thus comes to this: Can an adherent of the Quine-Davidson 
stance who hence agrees that semantic properties are exclusively determined by facts 
about verbal behaviour avoid embracing the indeterminacy of reference? I will argue 
that she can indeed. More precisely, I will argue that the way Quine and Davidson spell 
out premise (a) of the argument sketched, if combined with other ideas prominent in 
Quine and Davidson, undercuts rather than supports their case for premise (b). Anyone 
sympathetic to the Quine-Davidson stance who nevertheless abhors the consequences of 
referential indeterminacy can thus draw on the resources of this very position to avoid 
embracing (IR). I will moreover argue that it is hard to see how, given a commitment to 
this stance, one can hold on to the idea that reference is indeterminate. Adherents of the 
Quine-Davidson picture hence can and should avoid embracing referential indetermi-
nacy. Reassessing Referential Indeterminacy 
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3.  The Proxy Functions Procedure 
Given that semantic properties are exclusively determined by facts about verbal beha-
viour, we still have to see that these facts are compatible with indefinitely many radi-
cally different interpretations before we can conclude that reference is indeterminate. 
Quine and Davidson think that this is easy to establish. In fact, they do hold that estab-
lishing the truth of premise (b) poses no problem at all. They believe that we possess a 
simple quasi-mechanical procedure allowing us to proliferate correct interpretations 
(almost) at will. More precisely, Quine and Davidson hold that we know how to gener-
ate from any interpretation I of a language L indefinitely many new interpretations I*, 
I**, I*** … that all yield radically different assignments of extensions to terms, but that 
nevertheless all are correct for L, given that I is.
30  
Quine and Davidson rely on a straightforward two-step procedure.
31 Let us assume 
that I is a correct interpretation of some language L – say, and this is an assumption I 
will stick to throughout, I is our standard interpretation of English.
32 We then first of all 
specify a function that assigns every object in the domain of our interpretation I one 
(and only one) other object – its proxy. To devise such a proxy function, we could in 
principle enumerate the pairs of objects and proxies for all those objects that do not go 
proxy for themselves. Yet it appears more appropriate to put forth a rule that governs 
the mapping in question, ensuring that it comes out one-one. We can for instance rule 
that our proxy function f maps every object onto its shadow, or that it maps every object 
onto its cosmic complement, i.e. the rest of the physical universe.
33 We could also take 
up Putnam’s idea that f maps all cats on cherries, and vice versa, given there are just as 
many cats as cherries.
34 However, we could not map the rabbits on the undetached rab-
bit-parts, since such a mapping would not be one-one.  
In a second step, we employ the proxy function to generate a new interpretation I* 
from our interpretation I by the following stipulation:  
(S)  Every singular term designates in I* the proxy of the object it designates in I, 
and every predicate applies in I* to the proxies of the objects it applies to in I. 
For instance, if the proxy function used maps physical objects onto cosmic comple-
ments, ‘George W. Bush’ will designate in I* the whole of the physical universe minus 
George W. Bush. Reinterpreting our language by means of interpretations generated in 
accordance with our stipulation might hence lead to dramatic changes in reference. 
The outlined procedure nevertheless guarantees that core properties of the respective 
language L remain unaffected. Firstly, all syntactic features of L remain the same. Sec-
ondly, the ways the semantic properties of (open) sentences are determined by the se-
mantic properties of their parts and their structure is not affected. Thirdly, the meanings 
of logical particles will not change. Taken together, these invariances imply that all 
logical relations will be unaffected. They also imply that Quine’s famed apparatus of 
reference – ‘the apparatus of pronouns, pluralization, identity, numerals, and so on’
35 – Reassessing Referential Indeterminacy 
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will be precisely the same in I and in I*. Fourthly, coreference is not affected by the en-
visaged reinterpretation. If a and b refer to the same object in I, they will do so in I*; the 
same holds for coreferential predicates.
36 – Let me mention in passing that none of this 
holds true of the rather different (and evidently non-mechanical) procedure Quine ini-
tially employed in chapter 2 of ‘Word on Object’. For instance, shifting extensions from 
rabbits to undetached rabbit-parts amounts to a one-many mapping that leads to changes 
in coreferentiality and that necessitates manually adjusting the apparatus of individua-
tion on many reinterpretations of the native’s language. These facts have lead to sophis-
ticated objections to Quine’s argument.
37 Since neither criticism affects the proxy func-
tion procedure as outlined, it becomes comprehensible why Quine has all but dropped 
his initial line of thought in favour of the proxy function procedure. 
 The most important invariance, however, is yet another. For on any proxy function 
reinterpretation, the truth values of all sentences will remain the same. Any sentence 
true in I will be true in I*; the same holds for false sentences. As Quine stresses: “Proxy 
functions (...) leave the truth values of the sentences undisturbed“
38. That is hardly sur-
prising. For (S) makes sure that the changes in the extensions of singular terms and 
predicates are synchronised: whenever our new interpretation assigns a predicate some 
new referent for an old one, it makes sure that the singular term that designated the old 
referent now designates the new one.  
At first sight, then, it appears that Quine and Davidson are right. We apparently pos-
sess a quasi-mechanical procedure that allows us to proliferate correct interpretations 
(almost) at will. Hence, premise (b) of the argument outline above appears to be true. 
However, all we have seen so far is that given an interpretation I for a language L and a 
suitable proxy function, we can generate a new interpretation I* that assigns all sen-
tences of L the same truth-values as I. But that falls far short of what we have been 
promised. It should be obvious that simply assigning truth-values will not do. No se-
mantics that is exhausted by effecting a single distribution of truth-values over the sen-
tences of some language can possibly be adequate. Speakers sometimes assent to “It’s 
raining”, and sometimes they do not. Any adequate semantics has to respect the ensuing 
variation in truth-value. Any adequate semantics is hence bound to specify at least truth-
conditions. It is hardly worth emphasizing that this idea lies at the heart of Davidson’s 
approach to semantics, and that it is explicitly endorsed by Quine who for instance pro-
pounds: “We learn to understand and use and create declarative sentences only by learn-
ing conditions for the truth of such sentences”
39. Anyone sympathetic to the Quine-
Davidson approach is thus compelled to insist that we cannot consider I* to be a correct 
interpretation unless it assigns all sentences of L the same truth-conditions as I. Yet our 
proxy function procedure that supposedly proliferates correct interpretations is not even 
concerned with truth-conditions. Consequently, it cannot be taken to demonstrate that 
we can devise new as well as correct interpretations (almost) at will. 
There are ways out of this predicament. We can either deny that there is a relevant 
difference between truth-values and truth-conditions.
40 This is evidently hopeless.
41 Or 
we can try to construct a suitably generalised proxy function procedure. That is easy Reassessing Referential Indeterminacy 
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enough to accomplish. We simply have to take up the popular idea that the truth-
conditions of a sentence are its truth-values in all possible situations.
42 This manoeuvre 
allows us to stick to the semantic framework used, provided that we relativize it in a 
suitable fashion. So let me redefine an interpretation of some language L to be a com-
plete assignment of extensions to the singular terms and predicates of L in every situa-
tion. In short, an interpretation is a complete assignment of intensions. Let us moreover 
assume that a proxy function assigns every object in the domain of our interpretation in 
every situation a proxy. Given an interpretation I for our language L and a suitable 
proxy function, we can once again generate a new interpretation I* by stipulation:  
(S*)  Every singular term designates in every situation in I* the proxy of the object it 
designates in that situation in I, and every predicate applies in every situation in 
I* to the proxies of the objects it applies to in that situation in I. 
I* assigns all sentences of L in all situations the same truth-values as I. Hence, I and I* 
yield the same truth-conditions for all sentence of L. But as before, the extensions (as 
well as the intensions) I* and I assign to the terms of L might differ dramatically.
43  
This strategy has been pursued by Putnam.
44 Given the outlined predicament, anyone 
sympathetic to the Quine-Davidson account is also compelled to adopt it – even more so 
since it appears to be the very strategy Quine and Davidson implicitly agree on. Since 
Davidson wants his semantics to be empirically applicable, he relativises its core notion 
– truth – to speakers and times.
45 He also takes the evidence for radical interpretation to 
consist in holding-trues by speakers at times.
46 Davidson finally stresses that his seman-
tics is meant to apply to all actual and potential utterances, that is to say: to all utter-
ances across all possible situations.
47 Very much the same is true for Quine. Quine fa-
mously maintains that what is relevant for semantics are dispositions to assent to (or 
dissent from) queries posed on receiving perceptual stimulations. He relativises evi-
dence for translation as well as truth to stimulations.
48 Since Quine assumes that stan-
dards of perceptual similarity are stable across populations, we can understand him to 
hold that what counts are dispositions to assent to (or dissent from) queries posed with 
respect to certain scenes or in situations.
49 Hence, we can very well take Quine and 
Davidson to hold that a sentence’s truth-conditions are its truth-values in all possible 
situations, and we can take them to agree on a suitably generalised proxy function pro-
cedure. This is the view charity forces upon us anyway. Quine and Davidson explicitly 
avow that a reinterpretation leaves the truth-conditions of all sentences unaffected.
50 
But this is true on the generalised version of the proxy function procedure only. 
Given this charitable reconstrual, it turns out that Quine and Davidson are right. 
From an interpretation I for a language L and a suitable proxy function, we can indeed 
generate a new interpretation I* that assigns all sentences of L the same truth-conditions 
as I. This goes a long way towards demonstrating the indeterminacy of reference. Yet it 
might not go all the way. For even though our new interpretation I* assigns the same Reassessing Referential Indeterminacy 
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truth-conditions as I, it still might not be compatible with the total verbal behaviour 
speakers of L exhibit. That is to say, use might after all not boil down to a distribution 
of truth-values over situations. This is a thought anyone sympathetic to the Quine-
Davidson stance yet wary of referential indeterminacy should explore.  
4.  Use, Truth and the Proliferation of Interpretations 
In one respect, all differences between proxy functions are immaterial: any interpreta-
tion I* generated from an interpretation I by means of any proxy function will yield the 
same truth-conditions as I. In another respect, the differences between proxy functions 
might prove crucial. For the type of proxy function employed determines, as it were, 
how much the extensions assigned by I and I* differ. A proxy function that maps 
George W. Bush onto his nose, say, and every other object onto itself will yield a fairly 
moderate change in reference. A proxy function that maps all physical things onto se-
quences of real numbers will effect a sweeping change in reference and a radical shift to 
an all-out Pythagorean ontology. So let me distinguish three kinds of proxy functions.
51 
First, call those proxy functions that map every object o onto one and only one proxy o* 
that necessarily appears in just those situations o appears in close-in. Given some obvi-
ous idealisations, a function that maps every object onto its shadow falls into this class. 
Second, call a proxy function spot-on given that it is close-in and that it guarantees that 
an object o and its proxy o* always co-appear in the same location. That is to say, o 
must be in the space-time-expanse of o*, or o* must be in the space-time-expanse of o. 
A proxy function that maps objects onto their surfaces will be of this kind. Third, call a 
proxy function free-wheeling if it is neither close-in nor spot-on. The Quinean proxy 
function that maps objects onto their cosmic complements is free-wheeling. For the 
cosmic complement of some object o never is in the same situation as o. It hence is not 
close-in. A fortiori, it is not spot-on either.  
If a new as well as correct interpretation I* just has to mimic the truth-conditions of 
I, we can employ any proxy function to generate it. However, if the total use a commu-
nity makes of its tongue – i.e., on the Quine-Davidson reading: the actual and potential 
verbal behaviour the speakers exhibit – cannot be accounted for by a distribution of 
truth-values over situations alone, it might very well be that only a new interpretation 
generated by means of a certain type of proxy function can aspire to be correct. This is 
precisely what I am going to maintain. More to the point, what I will argue is this: there 
are aspects of verbal behaviour that any adherent of the Quine-Davidson stance in se-
mantics-cum-metaphysics had better acknowledge, yet that are not accounted for just by 
any proxy function reinterpretation designed to respect the distribution of truth-values 
over situations. This will provide the dissenting disciple of the Quine-Davidson stance 
with all the reason she needs to reject (IR). Reassessing Referential Indeterminacy 
 
 
9
 
4.1  Use and Situations   
Situations are small environments speakers find themselves in. More precisely, situa-
tions are complex arrangements of things (the word taken in its most liberal sense) that 
are spatially connected and temporally extended. Their boundaries are moreover not 
fixed once and for all but rather are determined by the perceptual – or, more general, 
epistemic – capacities of the respective speaker involved in it. All this is far from pre-
cise, but I guess that it will do for our purposes.
52 Given this explication, it seems obvi-
ous that every utterance of a sentence is made in a situation, but not every utterance is 
tied to the situation it is made in. Focussing on assertions, my assertion “It’s raining” is 
apparently tied to the situation I am presently in, whilst my assertion “Tigers are carni-
vores” evidently is not. What is important now is that the intuitive difference just pro-
fessed can be cashed in in behavioural terms. For a specific change in the situation will 
lead me to stop asserting the first sentence. But no such specific change will stop me 
from asserting the second. Yet if that is so, there apparently are, for at least some utter-
ances, observable facts about verbal behaviour as to whether these utterances are or are 
not tied to the situation they are made in.  
Anyone adhering to the Quine-Davidson approach in semantics is bound to acknowl-
edge the distinction just made. Firstly, it merely echoes the Quinean insight that not 
every assent is prompted by the situation it occurs in.
53 Secondly, the role Quine assigns 
to dispositions is hardly compatible with the opposite idea. For modelling the linguistic 
competence by way of dispositions just is to build the ability to detect specific differ-
ences into the very account of language mastery. What is more, anyone sympathetic to 
the Quine-Davidson account is bound to acknowledge that at least for some of my utter-
ances, there are behavioural facts of the matter as to whether they are tied to the situa-
tion they are uttered in or not. Quine and Davidson presume that the radical inter-
preter/translator can and does correlate utterances (or rather: assents or holding-trues, 
respectively) and situations, which he couldn’t do unless he had available the respective 
behavioural facts. Yet on the non-intentional account of use shared by Quine and 
Davidson, what is captured by dispositions and ascertained by radical procedures just is 
verbal behaviour or use.  
On Quine-Davidson premises, it hence turns out that it sometimes is a fact about use 
whether an utterance is tied to the situation it is made in. Now think of a language L 
whose use is such that some of its utterances are tied to the situations they are made in, 
and some are not. Think, say, of ordinary English. Imagine that we employ a proxy 
function that maps all physical objects onto sequences of real numbers to generate a 
new interpretation I* for L. This new interpretation will assign all sentences of L their 
ordinary truth-conditions. Yet I* will not be compatible with the use speakers make of 
L. For in I*, no utterance will be tied to the situation it is made it – and that does not 
accord with the use of L. From this it follows that not just any proxy function can ac-
complish a correct reinterpretation. A proxy function is suited to generate a new as well 
as correct interpretation only if it is close-in; free-wheeling proxy function simply will 
not do. Only if things and their proxies necessarily co-appear in the same situations can Reassessing Referential Indeterminacy 
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we be sure that the reinterpretation might be compatible with the total use speakers 
make of their language.  
This has far-reaching ramifications. We can generate indefinitely many new interpre-
tations only if there are indefinitely many suitable proxy functions. The assumption that 
there are appears innocuous enough as long as we are simply concerned with truth-
conditions. For on that premise, any function will do. Yet we have just seen that only 
fairly special functions are suited to generate interpretations that are not only new but 
also potentially correct. If these functions are to be specified by a rule rather than by an 
enumeration of things and proxies, they are moreover not that easy to come by. The ar-
gument so far hence already limits the scope of a possible indeterminacy. Correct inter-
pretations cannot differ as radically as Quine and Davidson propound. The reference of 
the English expression ‘cat’ might still be indeterminate; but ‘cat’ for sure neither refers 
to cherries nor to cosmic complements of cats. By narrowing its scope, the argument 
also limits the extent of a possible indeterminacy. There are not as many correct inter-
pretations as Quine and Davidson think. Maybe we can proliferate interpretations. But 
given the layout of the Quine-Davidson stance, we cannot proliferate interpretations at 
will. There still is hope for the dissenting disciple. 
4.2  Use and Segments of Situations 
Some utterances are tied to the situation they are made in, and some are not. That is a 
fact about use. However, use plausibly is even more specific. Certain utterances are tied 
to certain subregions of the situation they are made in rather than to the situation as a 
whole. Some of these subregions might not change their positions within the situation 
over time. Some might very well do – think for instance of the subregion cut out by a 
tiger that slowly moves towards you. Let me call any such subregion a segment of the 
situation. Anyone adhering to a Quine-Davidson stance in semantics-cum-metaphysics 
must take it to be a fact about use that the utterance of some sentences are tied to certain 
segments rather than to whole situations – or so I will argue. 
To begin with, the relation between situations and speakers is mediated by observa-
tion: speakers observe the going-ons they are confronted with. Their verbal behaviour 
will be sensitive to the observations they make. That is, which sentences they assent to 
will depend on which observations they make. This relation between observations and 
use must of course be unaffected by any correct reinterpretation. As Quine puts it: 
The gross bodies themselves, charter members of our ontology, could thus 
be superseded by proxies and not be missed. The primordial visual patches 
would still prevail in all their salience and integrity, and the same old obser-
vation sentences would be keyed to them as before.
54 
Observation, however, is usually not sensitive to whole situations (or features distrib-
uted over whole situations) but to segments of them. If our tiger moves towards you Reassessing Referential Indeterminacy 
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from behind, you are unlikely to assent to “A tiger?”. Observations hence quite often 
are tied to segments of situations. The same holds for use. That again merely echoes a 
Quinean insight. Quine construes use in terms of queries on perceptual stimulations. He 
does so to make sure that use is keyed to segments of situations rather than to situations 
as wholes. This allows him to claim that, on reinterpretation, “verbal behavior proceeds 
undisturbed, warranted by the same observations as before and elicited by the same ob-
servations”
55. Hence, on Quinean premises, it is a fact about use that utterances are 
sometimes tied to specific segments of situations rather than to situations as wholes. 
Speakers do not simply observe. They react to the going-ons that confront them as 
well as to one another. It is evident that these reactions will often be tied to segments of 
situations rather than to whole situations. Since the reactions in question might very 
well be verbal, use will quite often be tied to segments rather than to situations as 
wholes. This idea is central to the account of triangulation so vital to Davidson’s stance:  
The basic situation is one that involves two or more creatures simultane-
ously in interaction with each other and with the world they share; it is what 
I call triangulation. It is the result of a threefold interaction, an interaction 
which is twofold from the point of view of each of the two agents: each is 
interacting simultaneously with the world and with the other agent. To put 
this in a slightly different way, each creature learns to correlate the reactions 
of the other with changes or objects in the world to which it also reacts.
56  
Davidson assumes that the reactions of the agents described are fine-grained enough to 
be tied to specific changes or objects as well as the reactions of another creature to this 
changes or objects. But the scenario sketched is Davidson’s model of the very pre-
linguistic as well as pre-cognitive (verbal) behaviour that gives rise to thought and lan-
guage. It is, in short, his model of semantically constitutive verbal behaviour or use. 
Hence, Davidson has to agree that it is a fact about use that utterances are tied to spe-
cific segments of situations rather than to situations as wholes. 
There is yet another aspect of use that makes it safe to assume that utterances some-
times are tied to segments of situations: speakers interact with segments of situations, 
and these interactions are mirrored by their utterances. Speakers put on shoes, pack 
backpacks, gesture towards mountains, and occasionally run from tigers. These are in-
teractions with segments of situations. These interactions will affect the verbal behav-
iour of the speakers in question. Imagine our fleeing hiker to shout “A tiger! A tiger!”. 
The interaction he is engaged in is an interaction with a certain segment that is cut out 
by a tiger. Since this interaction is what guides his use – since this segment is what 
prompts his verbal reactions – we can conclude that his utterance is tied to that very 
segment. Still, we cannot infer that his utterance refers to a tiger. For the segment cut 
out by a tiger contains many things. It for instance contains the tiger’s surface, its centre 
of gravity, and its texture. To assume that our speaker focuses on the tiger rather than Reassessing Referential Indeterminacy 
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on, say, its centre of gravity just is to assume that he shares our referential apparatus – 
and that might be a contentious assumption. 
Anyone adhering to a Quine-Davidson stance in semantics-cum-metaphysics must 
hence take it to be a fact about use that some utterance are tied to segments rather than 
to whole situations. Hence, only a reinterpretation that guarantees that things and their 
proxies occur in the same segments of situations can be compatible with all facts about 
use. Yet if that is so, close-in proxy functions will not do. What Quine and Davidson 
need in order to generate a new as well as correct interpretation rather is a spot-on 
proxy function. This fact further narrows the scope as well as the extent of a possibly 
indeterminacy. Proliferating interpretations might after all be a far harder business than 
it seemed. The dissenting disciple of the Quine-Davidson stance might hence still avoid 
embracing the idea that reference is indeterminate. 
4.3  Use and Homogeneity 
An interpretation assigns each predicate for each situation an extension. So does any 
interpretation I* generated from it by means of a proxy function. If the proxy function is 
spot-on, as I will assume it is, any object will be in the same segments as its proxy. For 
instance, the things ‘tiger’ applies to in I* will be in the space-time-expanse of the 
things ‘tiger’ applies to in I. The extensions thus determined might nevertheless be 
fairly different. The one might be a set of tigers, whilst the other is a set of surfaces of 
tigers. Worse still, the one might be a set of tigers whilst the other might be an assort-
ment of things that appear in the expanses of tigers. It might contain a left whisker of a 
tiger, the tip of the nose of a tiger, and a tiger’s centre of gravity. The first two sets are 
homogeneous, i.e. they contain only things that are of the same kind. The third is het-
erogeneous. Yet by the standards so far defended, this set might very well be a correct 
extension for the predicate ‘tiger’. That is hard to believe. So let us see whether the se-
mantics and metaphysics of the Quine-Davidson stance does provide the dissenting dis-
ciple with enough resources to defend the following constraint: any correct reinterpreta-
tion has to respect the homogeneity of extensions. If I assigns to some (observation) 
predicate a homogeneous extension, I* must do the same.  
Let me present two considerations to support this idea. Quine and Davidson hold that 
semantic properties are exclusively determined by facts about the non-intentional use of 
language. This assumption implies that there cannot be a difference in meaning if there 
is no difference in use. This principle covers sentences. Hence, if p and q are used in the 
same way, they have the same semantic properties. Yet it also applies to utterances. 
Hence, if two utterances of the sentence p are basically alike, they have the same se-
mantic properties. Admittedly, both ideas are as vague as the principle they rest on. 
They still support the proposed constraint. For they lend plausibility to the claim that if 
a speaker is concerned with qualitatively very similar segments s and s* of a situation, if 
his observations are by and large the same, and if his verbal behaviour is basically un-
changed, we have good reasons to assume that the predicate ‘tiger’ he employs picks Reassessing Referential Indeterminacy 
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out things of the same kind on both occasions. In other words, if the verbal behaviour of 
our speaker is not merely an outward sign of unobservable yet semantically fundamen-
tal mental activity – a view Davidson and Quine alike reject
57 – then we are concerned 
with two utterances that are alike in all semantically relevant respects. To rehearse 
Davidson’s claim: “What wants emphasizing is not that use points the way to preexist-
ing meanings, but that it creates, and so constitutes, meaning”
58. That should give us 
sufficient reason to believe that our speaker is concerned with qualitatively very similar 
items on the two occasions. Assuming otherwise just is to propose an indiscernible 
variation between these instances, which in turn amounts to upholding the mentalistic 
picture of introspective semantics so alien to the Quine-Davidson view.  
The second line of reasoning draws on quite different resources. Languages are 
learned. According to Quine, we learn our languages “by observing other people’s ver-
bal behavior and having [our] own faltering verbal behavior observed and reinforced or 
corrected by others“
59. According to Davidson, languages are learned by asymmetric 
triangulation from an already competent speaker.
60 Both accounts take for granted that 
speakers are capable of generalising from their learning situations. According to Quine, 
we possess a ‘pre-linguistic quality space’
61 that guides our generalisations, and David-
son designs triangulation as a social situation since he believes that only social interac-
tion can constitute similarity and hence ground generalisations. On these accounts, we 
have no reason at all to suppose that the generalisations in question lead to a heteroge-
neous extension for ‘tiger’. There is nothing in these behaviouristic learning situations 
that warrants the idea that someone will learn to apply ‘tiger’ to noses of tigers on one 
occasion and, say, centres of gravity of tigers on another. In fact, if we take up David-
son’s assumption that a cycle of reciprocal observations and reactions gets language 
learning off the ground, the idea that the ensuing extension might contain assortments of 
rather different items loses all plausibility.  
Let us nevertheless for the moment suppose that the predicate ‘tiger’ as used by our 
speaker does have context-dependent conditions of application. For instance, let us as-
sume that he applies ‘tiger’ to noses of tigers on one occasion, and to whole tigers on 
another. If that is so, the speaker’s ability to apply the predicate without hesitation is 
also likely to vary with the context. Whether this is so, however, is an empirically ascer-
tainable fact about his verbal behaviour. Significant as well as systematic differences in 
verbal behaviour across actual and potential situations – or rather the lack thereof – do 
thus give us good reason to discard inhomogeneous extensions in reinterpretation.  
Consequently, it might appear sensible to uphold the homogeneity constraint. For it 
might very well be that an otherwise impeccable reinterpretation for a language L that 
does not respect homogeneity leads to an interpretation that is not compatible with the 
use speakers make of L. In fact, most reinterpretations Quine and Davidson propose do 
respect this constraint. Since they proceed via rules rather than by explicitly pairing ob-
jects and proxies, most proxy functions Quine and Davidson employ ensure that the 
homogeneity of extensions remains unaffected in reeinterpreting; just think of their 
mappings of things onto shadows or onto space-time coordinates. Given their general Reassessing Referential Indeterminacy 
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stance in semantics-cum-metaphysics, there appears to be reason to it – as we have just 
seen. The Quine-Davidson approach to semantics-cum-metaphysics thus does indeed 
provide the resources to defend the homogeneity constraint on reinterpretation.  
This is good news for the dissenting disciple. For the homogeneity constraint further 
limits the extent of indeterminacy. It might do so even more effectively than one thinks. 
For the argument carries over from extensions to intensions. If there is reason to think 
that homogeneity within situations must be respected, there also is reason to think that 
homogeneity across situations must be respected. Again, most reinterpretations Quine 
and Davidson propose do satisfy even this stricter constraint. Yet it rules out that we 
can generate a correct interpretation from a given one Putnam-style by swapping the 
extensions of ‘cat’ and ‘cherry’ in some possible situation.
62 For the reinterpretation 
does not respect the homogeneity of intensions. 
4.4  Use and Causal Connections 
It is widely assumed that causation plays an important part in determining reference.
63 
This assumption is compatible with the idea that use determines all semantic facts. For 
causal relations are very likely to be an ingredient in the complex interplay between ut-
terances and going-ons in the world that constitute the use of language. That anyway is 
what Quine and Davidson believe. Quine’s account of verbal behaviour pivots on causal 
dependencies between observed situations and responses. Central to his account is the 
behaviour prompted by situations and the assent or dissent elicited by the prompting 
situation plus a query such as “Tiger?”.
64 Davidson also holds that causation is essential 
to the determination of meaning and belief. In his account of triangulation, he combines 
the idea that semantic properties are determined socially with his conviction that “the 
stimuli that cause our most basic verbal responses also determine what those verbal re-
sponses mean, and the content of the beliefs that accompany them”
65. A Quine-
Davidson stance in semantics-cum-metaphysics hence compels one to endorse the fol-
lowing causal constraint on admissible reinterpretation: no new interpretation I* can be 
correct unless it can account for the causal relations that are relevant to use.  
Before I assess the causal constraint, let me mention that there is an obvious although 
modest role for causation to play. Invoking causation allows us to further elucidate 
those aspects of use we have drawn on earlier. It is very plausible to assume that obser-
vation, reaction, and interaction have a causal dimension; for all we know, these rela-
tions are causally mediated. This might explain why observation, reaction, and interac-
tion are tied to segments rather than to whole situation, since causal relations connect 
them to those.
66 Invoking causation thus lends further credibility to the case made 
above.  
The causal constraint is quite often assumed to be all one needs to establish that ref-
erence is perfectly determinate.
67 That is to say, it is often assumed that causation will 
single out a unique correct interpretation for a language. There are reasons to be scepti-
cal, though. To begin with, even if causation plays an eminent role in determining refer-Reassessing Referential Indeterminacy 
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ence, this causal determination will plausibly be mediated by a number of other factors. 
This is nicely brought out in Glymour’s sketch of a causal account: 
[T]alk of intended interpretations should be replaced by talk of causally de-
termined reference relations; roughly, our physical and social circum-
stances, and sometimes perhaps our beliefs as well, determine together a se-
ries of links connecting words and objects, and thus delimiting the admissi-
ble interpretations of our theories.
68 
Yet if that is so, we cannot be sure that the mediating factors do not allow indetermi-
nacy to come back in, as it were, through the backdoor. So let us concentrate on a sim-
plified model and assume with Davidson that “in the simplest cases words and thoughts 
refer to what causes them”
69. Thus understood, the causal constraint does indeed rule 
out some reinterpretations. For instance, it rules out an interpretation that takes ‘tiger’ to 
apply to centres of gravity of tigers. A tiger is the right kind of entity to enter into causal 
relations. A centre of gravity, being a Reichenbachian illatum, will hardly qualify for 
this role. The causal constraint hence rules out reinterpretations by highlighting the fact 
that the proxy for a potentially causally efficacious item must be potentially causally 
efficacious as well.
70 
So – does the causal constraint yield a unique interpretation? Well, whether or not 
the constraint allows us to discard, say, a reinterpretation that makes ‘tiger’ apply to 
surfaces of tigers depends on how finely causes are individuated. If tigers and their sur-
faces count as the same cause (or as aspects of the same cause), this interpretation is not 
ruled out. If on the other hand tigers and surfaces of tigers count as different causes (or 
as aspects of different causes), the envisaged reinterpretation will not be compatible 
with the actual causal relations. In other words, if causes are sliced finely, the causality 
constraint will pin down reference; yet if causes are sliced coarsely, it will not. Both 
stances mark entrenched positions in the theory of causation.
71 However, there is hardly 
a choice here for anyone sympathetic to the Quine-Davidson stance in semantics-cum-
metaphysics. For Quine and Davidson are explicit on this: causes and effects are to be 
individuated coarsely.
72 Hence, if you are the dissenting disciple wary of referential in-
determinacy, appealing to the causal constraint allows you to further limit the scope and 
extent of the threatening indeterminacy by ruling out reinterpretations from concrete 
objects to illata. Yet it won’t give you referential uniqueness.  
5.  Wrapping Up: Reassessing Referential Indeterminacy 
The idea that semantic properties are exclusively determined by facts about the behav-
iouristically conceived use of language lies at the very heart of the Quine-Davidson 
stance in semantics-cum-metaphysics. Given this account, the issue of the indetermi-
nacy of reference boils down to a simple question: does verbal behaviour or ‘use’ radi-
cally underdetermine reference? Quine and Davidson proclaim that it does. They main-Reassessing Referential Indeterminacy 
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tain that we possess a quasi-mechanical procedure that allows us to generate indefinitely 
many new yet radically different interpretations all of which are compatible with the 
total use speakers make of their language. For any language L, there hence are indefi-
nitely many radically different yet equally correct interpretations. Reference, they con-
clude, is indeterminate. There are no facts of the matter as to what names designate and 
what predicates apply to.  
I have argued that all this is hardly convincing even if adheres to the Quine-
Davidson stance in semantics-cum-metaphysics. To begin with, the simple proxy func-
tion procedure Quine and Davidson employ cannot sustain their argument. Only an in-
terpretation generated by means of Putnam’s generalised proxy function procedure 
might be compatible with total use, for only such an interpretation effects the same 
truth-conditions, or rather: the same distribution of truth-values of situations, as the 
original interpretation. What is more, if you adhere to the Quine-Davidson understand-
ing of use or verbal behaviour, you have to acknowledge that there are aspects of verbal 
behaviour that are not accounted for just by any proxy function reinterpretation de-
signed to respect the distribution of truth-values over situations. You have to acknowl-
edge that some utterances are tied to situations, that some utterances are tied to seg-
ments in situations, that some predicates have non-context-dependent conditions of ap-
plication, and that use involves causal dependencies. From this it follows that only a 
new interpretation that has been generated by means of a spot-on proxy function that 
respects the homogeneity of extensions as well as of intensions and that guarantees that 
any proxy for a potentially causally efficacious item is potentially causally efficacious 
as well can possibly be compatible with total use. Consequently, the scope of any ad-
missible reinterpretation is fairly limited. The extensions correct interpretations may 
assign simply cannot vary that much.  
This are good news for the dissenting disciple. For he now can rebuff the indetermi-
nacy thesis, as it were, from within. To begin with, contrary to what Quine and David-
son maintain, it has become obvious that the proxy function procedure is not a quasi-
mechanical procedure. It is not a procedure that, as it were, automatically yields new as 
well as correct interpretations. It can do so only if we provide a very special proxy func-
tion. Mapping objects onto cosmic complements, shadows, numbers or centres of grav-
ity simply will not do the trick; in fact, almost none of the mappings proposed by Quine 
and Davidson proves feasible. What the champion of referential indeterminacy needs is 
proxy function that is spot-on, that respects homogeneity, and that provides causally 
equivalent proxies. It should by now be obvious that these functions are fairly hard to 
come by. We can map things onto their surfaces or their textures. What else can we do 
to devise an adequate proxy function? Not that much, I am afraid. Consequently, the 
dissenting disciple can conclude that the extent of an admissible reinterpretation is seri-
ously limited. There for sure are not as many correct interpretations as Quine and 
Davidson think.  
Yet if that is so, the argument propounded by Quine and Davidson fails. It simply 
does not establish that there are indefinitely many radically different interpretations all Reassessing Referential Indeterminacy 
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of which are compatible with total use. It does not even show that there are many of 
those. Anyone drawn to the Quine-Davidson position yet wary of referential indetermi-
nacy hence need not hold that reference is indeterminate. It can even be argued that any-
one sympathetic to the Quine-Davidson stance should not hold this. We have seen that 
use – even use behaviouristically construed and equated with verbal behaviour – cuts 
finer than distributions of truth-values over situations. In fact, I have provided evidence 
that use so conceived cuts very much finer than the distribution mentioned. Hence, any 
adherent of the Quine-Davidson position will have to admit that there are facts about 
designation and application. At worst, these facts are mildly disjunctive: ‘tiger’ refers to 
tigers or to textures of tigers or to surfaces of tigers. At worst, then, reference is blurred 
or vague. That might still be embarrassing. But it falls far short of the indeterminacy 
notoriously claimed by Quine and Davidson; and it for sure dissolves neither reference 
nor intentionality. Consequently, any avowed adherent of the Quine-Davidson stance in 
semantics-cum-metaphysics can and should reject the claim that reference is indetermi-
nate. 
It is about time to drop the by now familiar caveat. Many philosophers reject the 
Quine-Davidson account of A facts. That is to say, they discard the idea that semantic 
properties are exclusively determined by facts about the (non-intentional) linguistic be-
haviour of speakers. However, most philosophers do hold that use is at least part of 
what determines semantic properties, and they admit that mere verbal behaviour is at 
least part of what the total use of a language consists in. Consequently, any dismissal of 
referential indeterminacy that makes do with a Quine-Davidson account of verbal be-
haviour can be sustained quite independently of their stance. We hence can and should 
reject the idea that reference is indeterminate.  
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Notes 
 
1   I will exclusively focus on referential indeterminacy and ignore the indeterminacy 
of translation. There is reason to this, see section 3 and especially footnote 38. 
2   See Davidson 1977, 216, Quine 1995, 59, Kripke 1977. 
3   See Quine 1960, 73, Quine 1968, 47, Wilburn 1992, 281. 
4   Quine 1992, 50, see Davidson 1996b, 169. 
5   See Quine 1990, 7, Davidson 1979, 228. 
6   See Quine 1968, 47. 
7   See Field 1973, 462. 
8   For simplicity’s sake, I will ignore indexical expressions.  
9   If not indicated otherwise, please take talk of ‘properties’ as an ontologically neu-
tral (and hence Quine-Davidson compatible) façon de parler.  
10   See Quine 1995, 72f, Davidson 1979, 227. 
11   See Quine 1968, 27, Davidson 1999, 81. 
12   See Schiffer 1987, 2. 
13   This is how Quine can hold on to talk of ‘reference’ even though his indetermi-
nacy-claim has dissolved systematic semantic word-object relations. Quine devises a 
two-pronged strategy in that he, firstly, understands inter-linguistic reference statements 
as manifesting our translational preferences rather than truth-evaluable claims about 
referential properties. He, secondly, urges us to understand inner-linguistic reference 
statements as disquotational. See Quine 1981b, 19f, Quine 1990, 6, Quine 1992, 52, 
Quine 1995, 75. For comments on Quine’s disquotational account see Stroud 1995. – 
For a similar disquotational strategy to cope with referential indeterminacy see see Put-
nam 1976, 136, Putnam 1981, 52. For an analysis of Putnam’s ideas see Brown 1988, 
153. For a fully developed disquotational theory of reference see Horwich 1998, ch. 5. 
14   Quine appears to share this view on the consequences of referential indetermi-
nacy. His endorsement of referential indeterminacy drives him to adopt a ‘global struc-
turalism’, see Quine 1995, 74f. Quinean global structuralism pivots on the idea that the 
ontology, summarizing the interpretation of the names and predicates, is incidental to a 
language or theory; what matter are rather its structure and the meanings of its sen-
tences. To adopt this view is to acknowledge the consequences of referential indetermi-
nacy just outlined. – On Quine’s global structuralism see Quine 1992b, 8f, Quine 1992, 
31-36, Quine 1979b, 164f, Quine 1981b, 20 and Rosner 1996. 
15   Leeds 1973, 491, see Devitt 1984, 173 and Wilburn 1992, 281. 
16   On the converse claim the implication is more obvious still: If you believe with 
Quine and Davidson that what you think is what you (would) say, indeterminacy of ref-
erence evidently entails indeterminacy of intentionality. 
17   To be sure, there is a lot of disagreement between Quine and Davidson. Yet for 
the purpose of assessing referential indeterminacy, I believe that we can safely ignore 
these differences and concentrate on what is shared between them.  Reassessing Referential Indeterminacy 
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18   I presume throughout that the indeterminacy thesis is not essential to a Quine-
Davidson position.  
19   See the references in footnote 31. 
20   See van Cleve 1992, 344. 
21   See Quine 1992, 37f. 
22   Quine 1968, 29. See also Quine 1960, ix, 29, Quine 1968, 26ff, Quine 1972, 444, 
Quine 1975, 87ff, Quine 1987 5, 10, Quine 1992, 37f.  
23   Quine 1975, 91. As Glock 1996, 155f argues, Quine himself does not stick to this 
radically non-intentional account of ‘assent’. See also Glock 2003, 175ff. I will let this 
pass. – For the method of query and assent see Quine 1975, 88, Quine 1960, ch.2.  
24   Quine 1960, 30. 
25   Davidson 1999, 81, my emphasis. 
26   For the importance of propositional attitudes in Davidsonian semantics see e.g. 
Davidson 1974, 144, Davidson 1974b, 196, Davidson 1973, 127, Davidson 1990, 316, 
318f. 
27   Davidson 1990, 314, see Davidson 1996b, 169. 
28   Davidson 1999c, 4, see e.g. Davidson 1991, 159f, Davidson 1996b, 165-167. For 
an analysis see Child 1994, 18-22, Talmage 1997 and Føllesdal 1999. It is very impor-
tant to discern (i) asymmetric triangulation, where a already competent teacher instils 
competence on a pupil – see e.g. Davidson 1991, 159f – and (ii) symmetric triangula-
tion, where all individuals involved are neither competent speakers nor, as it were, com-
petent thinkers – see e.g. Davidson 1999c, 4f. Only the latter kind is of relevance here. 
29   See Quine 1990, 10, Davidson 1983, 315, see Davidson 1982, 476. – The argu-
ment might work both ways: given that a radical interpreter/translator must be able to 
uncover all the semantic-cum-intentional facts there are, we might want to conclude that 
only publicly observable behaviour is constitutive of semantic properties. – For an 
analysis of the interpretationism thus avowed see Child 1994, ch.1. 
30   See the references in the next footnote. 
31    See Quine 1979b, 165, Quine 1981b, 16ff, Quine 1990, 6f, Quine 1992, 36f, 
Quine 1992b, 8f, Quine 1994b, 179-182, Quine 1995, 71ff. See Davidson 1977, 224, 
Davidson 1979, 229, Davidson 1997, 6f. See also Wallace 1977, Kirk 1986, 116ff and 
Reynolds 1995. 
32   Or rather, a formalised fragment of English. I will not brood over the precise re-
quirements here. See footnote 43.  
33   See Davidson 1979, 230, Quine 1995, 71f. 
34   See Putnam 1981, 32-35. 
35   Quine 1968, 35. 
36   See Quine 1995, 72. 
37   See Evans 1975, Fodor 1994, ch.3. 
38   Quine 1995, 72. – Quine draws on this feature of the proxy-function procedure to 
draw a line between referential and translational indeterminacy. The indeterminacy of Reassessing Referential Indeterminacy 
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reference “(…) is the unsurprising reflection that divergent interpretations of words in a 
sentence can so offset one another as to sustain an identical translation of the sentence 
as a whole.”(Quine 1992, 50), whereas “[t]he serious and controversial thesis of inde-
terminacy of translation (…) is rather the holophrastic thesis (…) which (…) declares 
for divergences that remain unreconciled even at the level of the whole sentence, and 
are compensated for only by divergences in the translations of other whole sen-
tences.”(ibid.). Consequently, the two thesis are in a key respect independent of one an-
other: even if translation should prove determinate – even if our sentence prove to have 
determinate meanings – we do still have to worry about referential indeterminacy. 
39   Quine 1973, 78f. See Davidson 1967, Davidson 1984 passim and Quine 1973, 
65f, Quine 1975, 87f, Quine 1979, 131f and Quine 1995, ch.7. 
40   See Wallace 1977, 155-160. 
41   Given the way Quine oscillates between ‘truth-values’ and ‘truth-conditions’, one 
does wonder whether he believes that Wallace is right. Even though he stresses that 
“proxy functions (...) leave the truth values of the sentences undisturbed.” (Quine 1995, 
72), he summarises his argument as follows: “[W]e saw that the application of a proxy 
function to a language leaves the truth conditions of sentences unaffected.” (Quine 
1995, 75). 
42   See e.g. Cresswell 1991, Lycan 1987. 
43   The generalised procedure has another virtue: It applies to richer (fragments of) 
languages. It even applies to languages containing second order quantification as well 
as modal operators; see Hale/Wright 1997, 451f. Accordingly, the claim that we do in-
deed establish a result for natural languages gains in credibility.  
44   See Putnam 1981, ch. 2 and appendix, see also Hallett 1994, 70-75, Hale/Wright 
1997, esp. 448-452. 
45   See Davidson 1967, 32f. 
46   See Davidson 1973, 135f. 
47   See Davidson 1976, 174, Davidson 1967, 22. 
48   Quine 1975, 88. See Quine 1975, 88: “In what behavioural dispositions (...) does a 
man’s knowledge of the truth conditions of the sentence ‘This is red’ consist? (...) [I]t is 
the disposition to assent and dissent when asked in the presence or absence of red.” 
49   Quine 1995, 20. See ibid. for talk of ‘scenes’ and see Quine 1992, 39 for talk of 
‘situations’. – Quine himself is not too fond of his notion of ‘stimulus meaning’ either, 
calling it a ‘physicalistic parody of the mentalistic notion of private meaning.’(Quine 
1993, 114). 
50   See Quine 1995, 75, Davidson 1979, 229f. 
51   For a similar idea see Rey 1997, 476. 
52   The following argument is valid on any plausible account of situations. For in-
stance, it makes no difference for the argument whether you hold that situations involve 
properties – as Barwise/Perry 1983, ch.1 do – or whether you agree with Quine and 
Davidson that there are no properties.  Reassessing Referential Indeterminacy 
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53   See Quine 1960, 30. 
54   Quine 1990, 7, see Quine 1960, 72, 78 
55   Quine 1981b, 19. 
56   Davidson 1999c, 4. 
57   See Quine 1992, 37f, Davidson 1990, 315. 
58   Davidson 1999, 81, my emphasis. 
59   Quine 1992, 37f
 , see Quine 1973, ch.1-2. 
60   See Davidson 1992, 261ff, Davidson 1996b, 165f. – For the varieties of triangula-
tion see footnote 28.  
61   Quine 1960, 83. 
62   See Putnam 1981, appendix. 
63   See e.g. Leeds 1978, 113, Harman 1982, 569, 573, Devitt 1984, 275, van Cleve 
1992, 349, Blackburn 1994, 26. 
64   See Quine 1960, 28, 30. 
65   Davidson 1991, 160. 
66   See Kirk 1986, 12. 
67   See van Cleve 1992, 349. 
68   See Glymour 1982, 177. 
69   Davidson 1991b, 195. 
70   Putnam disagrees, arguing that ‘causation’ can be understood to mean ‘explana-
tion’ (Putnam 1981b, 213) and that causal relation hence cannot possibly rule out any 
proxy function reinterpretation, see Putnam 1989, 359, Putnam 1986, 269.  
71   See Dretske 1977, Mellor 1995, ch.9-11, Davidson 1967b. 
72   See Quine 1985, Davidson 1967b, Davidson 1995. Reassessing Referential Indeterminacy 
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